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Abstract
Substitution policies are strategies sometimes chosen in Sub-Saharan Africa for cur-
tailing the shortage of health professionals especially caused by the outflow of medical
personnel. The aim of our contribution is to propose a way to assess the merits and
drawbacks of substitution policies by developing a simple growth model of healthcare
productivity with medical brain drain. Within this framework, we use a medical care
production function of the CES type which aggregates low and high specialized health
workers. We then run simulations which compare scenarios with and without substitu-
tion strategies by using data from the Ghana’s medical sector.
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1 Introduction
The wide importance of health professionals shortage in developing countries1, which is ag-
gravated by a dramatic emigration flow, is well documented. The medical brain drain in
particular from Sub-Saharan Africa, has been addressed in several recent studies (by inter-
national organizations like WHO (2006), Awases et al.( 2004), OECD ( 2004), and public
health policy publications, in general). The number of physicians trained in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) who work in OECD countries allow to calculate a rate of outflow which is
alarming for some countries2: 27% for South Africa, 22% for Ghana and 14% for Uganda
(WHO, 2006). For all SSA countries, these figures are indicative of an increase of what is re-
ferred to as medical brain drain (9% in 1991, and 12% in 2003) (Bhargava, Docquier, 2006),
which particularly affects the Anglophone and Portuguese-speaking countries. Clemens and
Petterson (2008) have expanded the definition of medical brain drain to cover medical per-
sonnel born in Africa, no matter where they were trained. In this case, the percentage of
doctors born in Africa who are practicing in nine different host countries was, on average,
24% for the SSA countries in 2000. Moreover, a recent study which involved doctors located
in six different SSA countries also revealed that they had very pronounced intentions of em-
igrating, from 26% in Uganda, up to 68% in Zimbabwe3 (Awases, et al., 2004). This human
capital outflows4 do not constitute the only difficulty found with African health care sys-
tems, but it is certainly a considerable handicap for countries with limited resources, which
are confronted with the challenges associated with big pandemic (Chen, Boufford, 2005).
Among the strategies which are proposed and sometimes undertaken to curtail the short-
age of health professionals especially caused by the medical brain drain, some are strongly
1According OMS (2006, p. 12), the 57 countries that fall below a minimal threshold and which fail to attain
the 80% coverage level are defined as having a critical shortage. 36 of them are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
average ratio of physicians per 100,000 people in SSA is 15.5 compared to an average of 311 in nine selected
industrialized countries.
2Report: dcotors practicing abroad/(doctors practicing abroad + doctors remaining in their country of orgin)
3Percentage of doctors indicating an intention to emigrate in 2002: Zimbabwe: 68%; Ghana: 62%; South
Africa: 58%; Cameroon: 49%; Senegal: 38%; Uganda:26% (Awases et al., 2004)
4The reasons for this kind of brain drain are well documented in public health literature. In order of decreas-
ing importance, these are: low remuneration, insecurity, lack of medical equipment, lack of promotions, and a
search for training which is more advanced.... As far as host countries are concerned, the attraction factors are
well-known: the aging of the medical corps (doctors and nurses), a quantitative insufficiency in training efforts
as opposed to an increased demand for care, selective immigration policies, and active recruitment, targeted by
specialized agencies (Awases, et al. 2004, WHO, 2006, Saravia, Miranda, 2004).
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dependent on budgetary resources like: increasing qualified medical personnel’s health worker’s
remuneration, providing bonuses to emigrated doctors if they return, improving medical per-
sonnel’s living and working conditions, and directing aid towards development in the area
of medical personnel training. On the other hand, some policies are more structural or reg-
ulatory in nature. Coercive measures have been decided like the obligation to reimburse
educational expenses in the event that one’s emigration proves to be ineffective (Mensah, et
al., 2005) and recently, certain host countries introduced codes of good practice (Martineau,
et al., 2004, Scott, et al., 2004, Pagett, C., Padarath, A., 2007).
Another proposed solution concerns policies designed to increase substitutability be-
tween high qualified professionals with lower qualified personnel (Dovlo, D., 2004). These
strategies are aimed at making high and/or low skilled workers more polyvalent and thus
contribute to reducing the skill gap between different types of health professionals. Dolvo
(2004) distinguishes between two types of substitution.
Direct substitution consists of creating new qualified medical personnel who are less spe-
cialized than doctors but who deliver many services usually reserved for physicians. These
new qualifications need in general two to three years of training rather than five years in
medical school. (Buchan, Dal Poz, 2002). This policy is not new in Africa and in the case
of certain countries dates back to the elaboration of post-colonial health policies (Martineau,
et al., 2004). The organization of direct substitution has been documented by Ghana and
several eastern and southern African countries (Dolvo, 2004). The designation differs from
one country to another: clinical officer in Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia; medical assistant in
Malawi, Mozambique and Ghana. But the principle is based upon a general, shorter kind
of medical training, accompanied by a specialty, for example, anesthesia, ophthalmology,
orthopedics, reproductive medicine, general medicine, etc.
Indirect substitution (or delegation) doesn’t necessarily generate a specific training pol-
icy. The principle consists of the authorization of workers with weaker qualifications, or
who are less specialized in terms of carrying out duties or tasks which normally would not
be attributed to them. The most common instance is that of nurses taking over tasks which
have traditionally been the responsibility of doctors, in the developing countries, as well as
in the northern countries. The recent reforms by the British National Health System (NHS)
introduced two extensions (in 2002 and 2003) of the scope of nursing duties in relation to
medical prescriptions5 (Courtenay, Maynard, 2005). The nurses involved must have under-
5Independent extended prescibing in 2002; Supplementary prescribing in 2003 (Department of health, Lon-
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gone a short training (3-6 months) and be experienced. Along these lines, a substitution
of nurses for carrying out doctors’ tasks has been arranged in a certain number of southern
African countries: Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi (Padarath, et al., 2003). Dolvo
(2004) mentions training in Ghana which has been created for nurses who work in a rural
environment and who are required to carry out the same tasks which a doctor would. Still,
in Ghana, a second form of delegating is at work, in this case between specialist and general
physicians. The West Africa Post-Graduate College offers 18-month specialised courses for
generalist doctors so that substitution may be allowed.
Substitution policies might also reduce the emigration of high qualified medical profes-
sionals since more substitutable health workers will have more locally specific qualifications,
which are less valuable in the international medical jobs market6 (Martineau, 2004, Dolvo,
2004). The negative relationship between substitution and the outflow of medical person-
nel (doctors) might also be deduced by the general observation of a lower emigration rate
(between two and four times lower) for SSA nurses than for physicians (WHO, 2006).
Substitution policies have raised questions about their effectiveness in terms of healthcare
productivity. Evaluation studies which have been undertaken to justify the implementation
of substitution policies are poorly conclusive. Chopra et al.(2008) carried out a systematic
review of experiences realized over the past ten years which are concerned with the improve-
ment in human resource management in relation to health policy among which substitution
measures appear high on the list. The authors did not find studies about substitution ex-
periences which resulted in an increase in neonatal infections, complications or mortality.
However, they do insist on the fact that these analysis are almost not concerned with devel-
oping countries. Health economists (Richardson, et al., 1998, Maynard, 2006) have been
very critical regarding available evaluations of substitution experiments, since these studies
are based on simple case studies and the use of very small samples. Concerning Sub-Saharan
Africa, Awases (2004, p. 58) notices however that “ Cameroon and Senegal reported (....)
reasons for the decline in quality of health care, including that of non-qualified personnel per-
forming duties that are normally beyond their scope of practice, such as a nurse functioning
as a medical doctor.”
The aim of our contribution is to propose a way to assess the merits and drawbacks of
don.)
6According to Hongoro and McPake (2004, p. 1451) “Auxiliary cadres are often less employable abroad,
especially if the qualifications involved do not easily translate into those used in the developed world, such as
medical assistant or clinical officer.”
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substitution policies by developing a simple growth model of healthcare productivity with
medical brain drain. Within this framework, we use a medical care production function of
the CES type which aggregates different kinds of skills (low and high specialized health
workers). In the present paper, we treat the choice of the substitution degree (which may
vary from strict complementarity to perfect substitution) between both skills as a policy
issue. Accordingly, we examine two opposite scenarios. One in with a substitution policy
is designed to narrow the skills gap between different healthcare specialities and another
without public intervention. The first scenario will reduce skills specialization (and increase
skills substitution) and may also decrease the emigration rate of high skilled personnel. To
study the differential impact of both strategies on the dynamics of healthcare productivity,
we calibrate our model to available data from a Sub-Saharan African country like Ghana.
It appears that in the case of Ghana emigration of health professionals accentuates the
relative scarcity of the higher qualified. The absence of a substitution strategy will eventually
lead to a productivity collapse in healthcare services. On the other hand a substitution policy
weakens complementarity between both types of health workers and thus reduces in the short
run productivity gains from skills specialization. Since there is no strategy that uniformly
dominates the other, substitution policy assessments can hardly be achieved without having
some idea about the time preference of policy makers. Finally, this problem of intertemporal
choice persists, though at a lower extent, even if a substitution strategy could completely
eliminate the emigration of physicians.
2 The Model
We introduce a health care production function which integrates two types of skilled medical
workers: higher qualified health personnel (R) and lower skilled personnel (U ). The first
category may be represented by physicians and the second by graduated nurses. We consider
that both types of professionals are prone to emigrate.
Denote the emigration flow of higher and lower skilled personnel respectively by ER and
EN . Accordingly, we assume that the proportion of emigrants of each type are respectively
ξR (ξR = ER/R) and ξN (ξN = EN/N).The growth rates of higher and lower skilled
professionals who are trained by the domestic education system are exogenously given by g
and n. The law of motion of higher and lower skilled workers who remain in their country
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of origin are successively
R˙ = gR− E,
·
U = nU − E.
It follows that the growth rates of medical professionals who do not emigrate are
r =
R˙
R
= g − ξR, (1)
u =
·
U
U
= n− ξN. (2)
Assume that the (medical) labor input is a synthetic measure of higher and lower skilled
personnel given by following CES function:
L =
[
bR−β + (1− b)U−β]− 1β , −1 < β <∞. (3)
Following de la Grandville (1989), we normalize the parameter b for given initial values
of de R0 and U0 and assume that R0 < U0. We obtain following value:
b =
ρ1+β0
ρ1+β0 + µ0
, (4)
where ρ0 = R0U0 and µ0 =
wU(0)
wR(0)
the initial wage ratio of both skill types.
Denote the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and less skilled by σ = 1
1+β
.
The labor force index L that combines R and U is able to grasp the full range of substitution
degrees starting from strict complementarity (σ = 0 or β → ∞) to perfect substitution
(σ →∞ or β = −1). Notice that in the second case both labor-types are additive since they
are perfectly interchangeable.
Since we are also interested in the impact of complementarity on the emigration rate of
the higher skilled we will assume that the emigration rate ξ decreases with the degree of
labour substitution. So we write that ξR(σ) with ξ′R(σ) < 0 or ξ
′
R(β) > 0.
The health-care output function may be given as follows:
Y = F (K,AL) = Kα(AL)1−α, 0 < α < 1. (5)
The health care output (Y ) is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology which embeds
a synthetic measure of health labor L that is combined with a stock of capital (K) used
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in the health sector. A is a technology parameter. Technological change is described by
A(t) = A(0)egAt , where gA ≥ 0 is an exogenous growth rate. In order to focus on the
impact of available health labor forces we assume that A is given (gA = 0) and normalized
to 1. Since 0 < α < 1, where α is the share of capital in health care output, the health
technologies exhibits constant returns. Let us consider the case where capital is perfectly
mobile . We suppose that the international interest rate i is given and constant over time.
Furthermore, we assume that the capital depreciation rate is zero for simplicity. It follows
that the health system maximizes net profits for given (administered) health prices. For that
sake it equates the marginal product of capital to the international interest rate. We thus get:
f ′ = i, with k =
K
L
. (6)
Equation (6) is solved for the constant capital-labor ratio k = k =
(
α
i
) 1
1−α and the health
care output becomes:
Y (t) = f(k)L(t). (7)
The resulting growth rate of health care production becomes:
gY = gL.
After having calculated the logarithmic derivative of equation (3), it follows
gL = (u− r)(1− a(t)) + r, with a(t) = b
(
R(t)
L(t)
)−β
. (8)
We thus can write following law of motion of labor ratio equation:
a˙ = −βa(t)(r − gL) (9)
which is a standard Bernoulli equation and its general solution is given by (see Pieretti, Zou
2007, 2008)
a(t) =
1
1−a(0)
a(0)
eβ(r−u)t + 1
. (10)
Combining equations (8) and (10), it yields the growth rate of aggregated medical labor:
gL(t) =
(1− a(0)(u− r))eβ(r−u)t
(1− a(0))eβ(r−u)t + a(0) + r. (11)
Recalling equations (1), (2),(7) and (11), we can write as follows the average labor pro-
ductivity in the health care sector:
Y (t)
U(t) +R(t)
=
f(k)L0e
gLt
U(0)eut +R(0)ert
. (12)
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3 Simulations
Equations (11) (12) are useful for studying the impact of a substitution policy on the time
pattern of healthcare productivity. For running simulations we calibrate the model using data
from the Sub-Saharan African medical sector. More specifically, we focus on the case of
Ghana which appears as an important victim of medical brain drain7 and which was one of
the first countries to experience substitution policies.
By using data from various sources, may be extract following key-figures which help
calibrating our model to the case of Ghana.
The number of active physicians (or medical officers) estimated by the year 2004 was
3240 according to the World Health Organization (2008) and this number existing by the year
1995 may evaluated at about8 2400 according to data from the Ministry of Health, Ghana
(2005). Accordingly, the (constant) growth rate of doctors who did not emigrate equals9
r = 0.035. Since about 740 (Ministry of Health, Ghana, 2005) doctors emigrated during the
period 1995 -2004, the growth rate of annually educated doctors becomes10 g = 0.058. It
follows that the estimated emigration rate of doctors equals ξR = 0.023.
The situation of nurses for Ghana is grossly depicted by following data. In 1996 there
were 12961 (source: World Bank 2004) nurses working in Ghana and in 2004 their number
grew to 19707 (WHO, 2008). During the period 1996-2004 about 1700 (source : Ministry
of Health, Ghana, 2005) nurses emigrated. As above, simple calculations provide following
parameter values n = 0.065, ξU = 0.011 and u = 0.054. We further assume following
parameter values. (a) The ratio of higher to less qualified personnel measured at an initial
date equals ρ0 = R0N0 = 0.3. This value approximately corresponds to the ratio we would
observe by the middle of the seventies if we apply the growth rates calculated above. (b) The
international rate of interest is assumed to equal i = 0.05. (c) The share of capital in general
corresponds to α = 0.3 and the saving rate is supposed to be s = 0.10.
In order to study how a substitution policy may impact the time pattern of healthcare
productivity, we consider two alternative situations. First, no substitution policy is assumed,
7According to Dovlo and Nyonator (1999 ) some 60.9% of doctors produced in Ghana between 1985 and
1994 emigrated country, mainly to the United Kingdom and USA.
8This value is derived from data of the Health Ministry of Ghana (2005) about the annual numbers of trained
physicians .
9More exactly, r =
(
3240
2400
) 1
9 − 1 = 0.035
10More exactly, g =
(
3240+740
2400
) 1
9 = 0.058.
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and accordingly, healthcare skills will be highly specialized or weakly substitutable (a low
elasticity of skills substitution). Then, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between
higher and lower skilled healthcare workers may be increased by adequate policy decisions.
We already saw (see Introduction) that substitution policies may also be designed to reduce
medical brain drain of the higher skilled professionals. Since we are not able to precisely
assess the impact on this type of emigration, we consider extreme scenarios. At one extrem-
ity, we have perfect effectiveness (the optimistic case) and accordingly the emigration rate
of the higher skilled decreases from ξR to 0. On the other hand, there could be no effect at all
(the pessimistic case) by assuming that higher skilled personnel continue to emigrate. The
consequence would be that the value of the emigration rate remains at ξR = 0.023. In so
doing we consider that the reality lies somewhere in-between11. Notice that there is a declin-
ing trend in the ratio between higher and lower skilled health workers if we don’t consider
emigration (g < n). This trend is emphasized if emigration of both qualified personnel takes
place. The medical brain thus causes growing (relative) scarcity of physicians in Ghana. In
the optimistic scenario where a substitution policy is able to completely suppress emigration
of physicians the skills ratio would however remain almost constant or would increase very
slightly (g slightly exceeds u).
Figure 1: Substitution strategy without impact on medical brain drain
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Simulation results are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Each figure compares two time patterns
of healthcare productivity. One where a substitution policy is implemented and another one
without such a policy. Figure 1 depicts the pessimistic case where the healthcare policy has
no impact on the emigration rate of the higher skilled, whereas Figure 2 considers the opti-
11This imprecision will however show of minor importance for the arguments we will develop.
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mistic case (ξR = 0). If no healthcare policy is decided, the elasticity of skills substitution is
low (σ = 0.2) and the medical professions are specialized. The implementation of a substi-
tution policy narrows the skill gap between both healthcare professionals and the intra-labor
elasticity of substitution is assumed to climb to σ = 4.
Figure 2: Substitution strategy with full impact on medical brain drain
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The simulations show that the strategy (implementing a substitution policy or not) chosen
by the health ministry impacts very significantly the intertemporal shape of average produc-
tivity in the domestic healthcare sector. In the complementarity scenario (no substitution
policy) it appears that, compared to the case where there is high skills substitution, the pro-
ductivity path is higher in a first time interval and it lowers drastically afterwards until it
collapses. Since there is no path that strictly dominates the other, the choice of the right
strategy depends on the perceived time preference of the policy makers who face brain drain.
If they favor the short and middle term, they should prefer the complementarity case by not
deciding to implement a substitution policy. Being more forward-looking, they should fos-
ter skills substitutability since this strategy smoothens the time pattern of average healthcare
productivity12. In the medium and long run there will thus be no breakdown in healthcare
services as a consequence of growing (relative) scarcity in higher qualified health profes-
sionals.
As a general conclusion, we can say that a substitution policy may smoothen the dynamic
effects of (growing) high skills scarcity in the health sector but at a cost that could be high,
12In the case where a substitution strategy completely eliminates medical brain drain, we see in Figure 2 that
average health productivity is weakly increasing. This results from the fact that the ratio between doctors and
nurses increases slightly in this optimistic scenario.
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in the medium run, in terms of reduced productivity of healthcare services. The simulations
also show that a substitution strategy that is fully successful in decreasing the emigration rate
of physicians does not eliminate its depressing impact on productivity but that this effect is
slightly lowered.
4 Conclusion
In Sub-Saharan Africa, substitution policy regarding medical professionals is one of the
strategies that have been chosen to make up for the lack of highly qualified people working
in the health field. One rationale underlying this strategy is to reduce medical brain drain by
lowering the degree of specialization of skilled medical professionals. Our contribution is an
attempt to compare the effectiveness (in terms of average productivity in the health sector)
of alternative scenarios characterized by different degrees of skills specialization. For that
purpose we used a CES production function aggregating higher and lower skilled healthcare
personnel. In that context the concept of elasticity of substitution was central to characterize
the degree of specialization between different healthcare skills. So we assumed that the more
different skills are specialized, the less they are substitutable.
In our model we did not take account of possible “brain gain” effects on the sending
economy. In that context, we did not consider the impact of remittances from medical em-
igrants since these sums are not directly reinvested in human capital for the health system
(Stilwell et al., 2003). In addition, we did not model the effect of emigration on the incentive
to acquire healthcare education in the source country (Mountford 1997; Stark, Helmenstein
and Prskawetz, 1997 and 1998). If this phenomenon would impact differently the growth
rates of different types of healthcare professionals, the evolution in terms of relative skills
scarcity would be altered. For example, if the growth rate of nurses was the most affected,
the relative scarcity of doctors would worsen. There is however a lack of empirical evidence
on the possible effect of emigration on the growth rates of different health skills and their
possible impact on the workforce mix.
Rather than trying to reproduce reality, down to the slightest details, our intention was to
lend theoretical support to the assessment of some aspects of health care policy in developing
countries. Indeed, even if they are simplified, the scenarios we have discussed in this paper
bring forces into play which induce interesting dynamics. Accordingly, our simulations show
that during an initial phase, which may be rather long, the specialization of qualified medi-
10
cal personnel is more efficient than strategies implying high levels of substitution even if a
substitution strategy would fully cease medical emigration.
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